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STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:
REMOVING THE PROCEDURAL BARRIERS
By
Robert M. Myers*
"Give me a place to stand...
and I can move the earth."-Archimedes
i
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years public interest lawsuits have proliferated.2 Under
the rubric of taxpayers' suits, private attorney general actions, or public
interest litigation,3 the judicial process has been frequently resorted to
in order to vindicate important commonly shared rights in such areas
as civil liberties and civil rights, environmental conservation, adminis-
trative regulation, consumer protection, tax assessments, and municipal
affairs. Together with state initiatives, referenda, recall measures, pub-
lic hearings, and public record acts, public interest lawsuits serve to
ensure more meaningful and democratic participation in the govern-
mental decisionmaking process. At the same time, such measures af-
ford the public an opportunity to correct governmental abuses that
might otherwise go unchecked.
* B.A. California State University, Fullerton; ID. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles;
City Attorney of the City of Santa Monica; Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School
Portions of this article have been adapted from Collins & Myers, The Public Interest Litigant
in Californi." Observations on Taxpayers' Actions, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 329 (1977). The
author would like to thank Ronald K.L. Collins, Richard Rothschild and Crystal C. Sims
for their thoughtful comments.
1. 11 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 329 (R.M. Hutchins ed. 1952).
2. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 301
n.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum].
3. Public interest litigation has been described as that kind of lawsuit which "is brought
by private plaintiffs in the hope of achieving broader results by litigating issues of... cur-
rent importance which when resolved will affect substantial numbers of people." Id at 305.
For the definitional characteristics of the aforementioned description, see id at 304-05; Calm
& Calm, Power to the People or to the Profession?-he Public Interest in Public Interest
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public In-
terest Law. Theory and Practice at the Centerfor Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.J. 1095
(1971); Rabin, Lawyersfor Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 207 (1976). Since the above characteristics are common to private attorney general,
taxpayer, and public interest suits, the terms, although they may be technically distinguish-
able, will, for the purposes of this article, be used interchangeably unless otherwise specifi-
cally designated.
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Although the focus of public interest litigation is to vindicate im-
portant rights, the public interest litigant is regularly required to
demonstrate sufficient standing to maintain the action. Before address-
ing the substantive concerns giving rise to the lawsuit, the public inter-
est litigant must first overcome a myriad of jurisdictional barriers
typically erected by the defendants to forestall a decision on the merits.
This has been especially true in federal courts, where traditional article
III standing rules, requiring a plaintiff to have a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy, frequently bar public interest litigation.
4
In California, public interest litigants do not confront the same
restrictive standing rules that make the federal forum all but hostile to
vindicating public rights. This article will examine the current scope of
public interest standing in California. Additionally, this article will ex-
amine the doctrinal basis for standing in California courts and will ar-
gue that standing requirements should be discarded by state courts in
public interest litigation.
II. TAXPAYER STANDING
In the federal court system, taxpayers' suits5 are clearly of limited
utility to the public interest litigant. Despite the continued reluctance
4. See, eg., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923).
5. A description of taxpayers' suits can be found in 18 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 52.02-.03a, at 3-4 (3d rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
QUILLIN]; see infra text accompanying notes 16-19. For a broad analysis of taxpayers' suits,
see McQuILLIN, su~pra, § 52.01-.52, at 2-94; Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and
Summary, 69 YALE LJ. 895 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Taxpayers' Suits].
6. To bring a taxpayer action in federal court, potential litigants must comply with the
"two-tiered nexus test" of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Chief Justice Warren, writing
for the majority, outlined the test as follows:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconsti-
tutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution.... Secondly, the taxpayer must estab-
lish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the coxbstitutional in-
fringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the
challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the
enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.
Id at 102-03.
The net result of restrictive federal standing requirements is that the slow, cumbersome,
and sometimes unresponsive electoral process remains the only realistic federal forum avail-
able to taxpayers to check legislative and executive abuses. Ironically, not long ago the
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of federal courts to permit taxpayers to bring suits in the public interest,
however, state courts liberally permit such suits to be maintained.
This liberal attitude of the states hinges on three fundamental proposi-
tions. First, "the nominal nature of the individual taxpayer's interest is
held not to rule out his standing."' Second, the state courts reject the
notion that potential flooding of the court dockets constitutes sufficient
cause to ban taxpayers' actions.9 Third, the legislatures of the various
states have seen fit to encourage the challenge of illegal governmental
action. As Professor Schwartz aptly points out:
To the state judges, of greater importance has been the need
to ensure that invalid public action will not be rendered im-
mune from attack. In the state view, the taxpayer, both as
such and as a member of a society grounded upon the rule of
law, is intimately concerned with the validity of action taken
by the government which his tax dollars support.10
The combined effect of these three tenets of the states' general scheme
has been to place another sword for checking governmental abuses in
the otherwise meager arsenal of the citizen taxpayer." By contrast to
the federal forum, there is a plenitude of "standing" room in the state
courthouses for taxpayers.
As far back as 1858, the California Supreme Court established the
right of a citizen taxpayer to challenge the validity of local government
Supreme Court noted that "under the conditions of modem government, litigation may well
be the sole practicable avenue ... to petition for redress of grievances." NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); see Simpson, Ffty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REv.
171, 231 (1936); Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 5, at 910.
7. Only New Mexico bars state taxpayers' actions. Comment, Taxpayers'Actions.- Pub-
lic Invocation of the Judiciary, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 397, 402-03 (1977). Every state
now permits municipal taxpayers' actions. Id at 399-400.
8. B. ScHwARTz, ADMinSTRATIVE LAW 461 (1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
cited as ScHwARTz]; see Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957);
Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504-06, 193 P.2d 470, 474-75 (1948).
9. See ScHwARTz, supra note 8, at 462. In this respect, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
notes:
If any special evils flow from the extreme liberality of these state courts on the
problem of standing, the evils are not apparent in the reported opinions. The
courts are not flooded by cases brought by officious intermeddlers, and no sign
appears that the adversary system has been either destroyed or impaired.
3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRaATiSE § 22.10, at 254 (1958) (footnote omitted); see
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 470-71 (1970).
10. ScHwARTZ, supra note 8, at 462 (footnote omitted).
11. One commentator has observed: "Such litigation allows the courts, within the
framework of traditional notions of 'standing,' to add to the controls over public officials
inherent in the elective process the judicial scrutiny of the statutory and constitutional valid-
ity of their acts." Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 5, at 904.
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spending practices.12 By 1909, the state legislature had codified the
right of such plaintiffs.13 Today that provision, section 526a of the Cal-
ifornia Code of Civil Procedure, provides in part:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and prevent-
ing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the es-
tate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city
and county of the state, may be maintained against any officer
thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf,
either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is
assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the
commencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein.
14
Section 526a reflects the "very liberal" attitude of California courts
in permitting taxpayers to bring suits on behalf of the public to prevent
illegal governmental conduct.15 More importantly, as a unanimous
court in Blair v. Pitchess16 declared: "[t]he primary purpose of this stat-
ute. .. is to 'enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge govern-
mental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts
because of the standing requirement.' "17
The decisional law holds that "the principles of justiciability in
taxpayers' suits under section 526a differ fundamentally from the re-
strictive federal doctrine."' 8 That difference applies to taxpayers' suits
12. Foster v. Coleman & Alexander, 10 Cal. 278, 281 (1858); accord Winn v. Shaw, 87
Cal. 631, 637, 25 P. 968, 969 (1891).
13. Act of March 20, 1909, ch. 348, § 1, 1909 Cal. Stat. 578.
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 1979). The remainder of § 526a states:
This section does not affect any right of action in favor of a county, city, town, or
city and county, or any public officer;, provided, that no injunction shall be granted
restraining the offering for sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds for public
improvements or public utilities.
An action brought pursuant to this section to enjoin a public improvement
project shall take special precedence over all civil matters on the calendar of the
court except those matters to which equal precedence on the calendar is granted by
law.
Id; see Note, California Taxpayers' Suits: Suing State Officers Under Section 526a of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 28 HASTINGS L.. 477 (1976).
15. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49
(1971); Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 152, 193 P. 111, 125 (1920). In order to prevail under
§ 526a, "the taxpayer must establish that the expenditure of public funds which he seeks to
enjoin is illegal." National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Gain, 100 Cal. App.
3d 586, 599, 161 Cal. Rptr. 181, 188 (1979).
16. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
17. Id at 267-68, 486 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49 (quoting Taxpayers'Sults,
supra note 5, at 904). Recently, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in
Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 447, 613 P.2d 210, 222, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 161 (1980).
18. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 764, 533 P.2d 222, 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99 (1975).
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grounded on common law doctrines' 9 as well as those arising under
section 526a. The distinction between common law and statutory
causes of action is important in that one form of action may offer
broader standing than another. When a court decides to invoke a more
generous interpretation of the applicable taxpayer statutes, such a court
may well be availing itself of its independent powers under the prece-
dents established at common law. In part, the practice can be attrib-
uted to the conviction, long subscribed to in California, that public
interest litigation ought to be encouraged. For over a century the state
attitude has always been to encourage the private attorney general
"[b]ecause [when] the motive of a plaintiff-taxpayer is viewed as irrele-
vant, taxpayers' suits afford a means of mobilizing the self-interest of
individuals within the body politic to challenge legislative programs,
prevent illegality, and avoid corruption."'2
Given the long tradition of taxpayer suits in California, few issues
concerning the scope of such lawsuits remain unresolved. However,
when issues do arise, they usually fall within one of three categories:
the status of the plaintiff, the status of the defendant, or the nature of
the relief sought.2
A. Who QualYes as a Taxpayer Plaintf?.
Section 526a expressly confers standing upon four distinct classes
of litigants: (1) upon a citizen resident who is "assessed" a tax;
(2) upon a corporation which is "assessed" a tax; (3) upon a citizen
resident who "has paid a tax"; or (4) upon a corporation which "has
paid a tax." Separate and apart from any corporate status, a literal
interpretation of section 526a would indicate that a taxpayer plaintiff
must be a citizen resident in order to establish standing. However, the
California Supreme Court in Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach,22 held
that such a literal interpretation of the code violates federal equal pro-
tection guarantees:
We would consider these arguments [requiring local resi-
19. See Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 159-61, 496 P.2d
1248, 1254, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886 (1972); cases cited supra note 12.
20. Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 5, at 904 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see Mock
v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 58 P. 826 (1899); MCQJILLIN, suara note 5, § 52.11, at
20-22. In keeping with this general policy, the Legislature has enacted the Public Records
Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 6250-6261 (West 1980).
21. A more extensive discussion of the problem appears in Collins & Myers, The Public
Interest Litigant in California:" Observations on Taxpayers'Actions, 10 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 329
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Collins & Myers].
22. 65 Cal. 2d .13, 415 P.2d 769, 51 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
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dence] eminently persuasive if it were not for the fact that
[such a] reading of section 526a... violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No reason has
been presented to us, or conceived by us, which would render
less than arbitrary and capricious a distinction which would
give a nonresident corporate taxpayer the right to maintain a
suit such as here contemplated, but would deny the same right
to a nonresident taxpayer who is a natural person.
23
Significantly, the Irwin court extended the scope of section 526a to
encompass nonresident taxpayers even though the section expressly
precluded such an interpretation. Nevertheless, one fortuitous factual
aspect of the Irwin case might be interpreted as a limitation on the
court's holding. While the plaintiff in Irwin was not a resident tax-
payer, she was aproperly owner and had paid taxes levied against her
property by the city.24 That factor could arguably convert Irwin's hold-
ing to a sub silentio rule requiring property ownership whenever the
taxpayer plaintiff is not a citizen resident. While the Irwin court did
not pen a single word which would justify the notion that property tax-
payers are to be given special treatment, the plaintiffs status in that
case remains potentially significant.
However, such a property ownership requirement is at odds with
the logic of Irwin. The Irwin court's holding turns on the single princi-
ple that nonresident individuals should be treated no differently than
nonresident corporations. Certainly, the Irwin holding does not restrict
standing to those natural persons who are nonresident property owners.
The statute on its face requires no such ownership status. To adopt the
argument that an individual must be a real property owner within a
given city or county, while a nonresident corporation need not be,
would perpetuate the same kind of equal protection violation invali-
dated in Irwin. Moreover, it would prove equally discriminatory as
against nonresident lessees who do not own property. So understood,
any interpretation which would condition section 526a standing upon a
property ownership requirement would clash with the very rationale
applied in Irwin.25
Section 526a, as modified by Irwin, automatically affords standing
23. Id at 19, 415 P.2d at 772-73, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85 (emphasis added and omitted).
24. Id at 18-19, 415 P.2d at 772, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 884; see also Gamble v. City of San
Diego, 79 F. 487 (9th Cir. 1897); Taxfpayers' Suis, supra note 5, at 910.
25. A nonresident corporation which paid a sales tax within a given city, town, or
county, by the express terms of the statute, has a right to sue since it has "paid a tax therein."
Moreover, a nonresident, nonproperty owner plaintiff may just as easily form a close corpo-
ration which would, after paying a sales tax, have standing to sue under the statute. Nothing
Vol. 15
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to all corporate or individual plaintiffs who have paid a tax. Since the
statute does not specify the kind of tax required, the statutory language
can certainly be construed to include the payment of all forms of taxes,
such as license, gasoline, cigarette, sales, utility, and various business or
city income taxes. Moreover, section 526a requires only that the tax
being paid is ultimately deposited in the treasury of a city or county,
thereby precluding any necessity for tracing the tax paid to the activity
on which the complaint is based.26
At first blush, it may seem ludicrous to permit nonresidents to
challenge city or county actions merely because they have paid some
nominal tax. But when one recalls the "primary purpose" of state tax-
payers' suits,27 it is readily apparent that such criticism is unfounded.
The rule in California has always been that "[ilt is immaterial that the
amount of the illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures
actually permit a saving of tax funds." 28 The essential focus is on the
illegal or wasteful nature of the governmental act. It does not matter
that the plaintiff has suffered little or no injury as a taxpayer or that the
taxpayer is not a resident or local property owner. The only requisite is
that the complaining party has paid a tax and on that basis seeks to
enjoin certain illegal, wasteful or injurious acts which are incompatible
with the public interest of the citizenry affected. Consequently, the tax-
payer's primary interest inheres in the wrongful act committed against
the public per se. The various state court holdings which encourage
generous application of the rules in taxpayers' suits2 9-- even where the
plaintiff is a nonresident,3" or where the amount of the tax paid is de
mii )s,3 1 or where there is no showing of special damages to the tax-
payer32 -all lend support to the private attorney general concept of tax-
in California law, however, requires an earnest taxpayer litigant to embark upon such a
charade.
26. Cf. City of Columbus ex rel Willits v. Cremean, 27 Ohio App. 2d 137, 141-42, 273
N.E.2d 324, 327 (1971) (court held that payment of a city income tax was sufficient to grant
the plaintiff standing even though he was a nonresident of the city whose sewer charges he
was challenging).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
28. Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957); see County of Los
Angeles v. Superior Ct., 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 678, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435, 441 (1967);
SCuWA~~RTZ, supra note 8, at 461; Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 5, at 905. But see Shavers v.
Kelley, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978) (incidental expenditure insufficient for tax-
payer lawsuit), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
29. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 53.
32. See infra text accompanying note 56.
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payers' actions.33
This suggests that a citizen resident could properly maintain a tax-
payer action based upon even a nominal tax payment to the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the payment of a
property tax is necessary even by a citizen resident to invoke section
526a.34 This suggestion flies in the face of the plain wording of section
526a and would create an unwarranted distinction between taxpayers
who own property and taxpayers who do not.35 To avoid any unconsti-
tutional classification, section 526a must be extended to all taxpayers
regardless of the nature of the tax paid.36
Notwithstanding the long history of liberally interpreting section
526a, two appellate court decisions, Gould v. People37 and Di Suvero v.
County of Los Angeles,38 attempted to preclude taxpayer standing be-
cause of the existence of a potential plaintiff who might have personal
standing. However, the California Supreme Court, in Van Alla v.
33. Regarding the residency or property ownership questions, it cannot be accurately
maintained that only residents or property owners have a real interest in the actions of any
given community or that they are the only ones affected. This is borne out by the very
character of modem day city life. In a mobile society like our own, people do not restrict
their activities to a single locale. It is not uncommon to work in one city, live in another, and
seek entertainment in a third, while at the same time commuting through a number of other
cities or counties. Consequently, it is not necessarily accurate to picture the acts of one city
or county as affecting only its residents or property owners. Consider what would happen if
a metropolitan hub like Hollywood, California enacted an ordinance banning all cinema
theatres or all bookstores. Would only the residents or property owners of Hollywood be
harmed? See generally Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 718 (1979); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr.
745 (1972); Hutchinson, Standing to Sue in Public Interest Litigation, 7 LINCOLN L. Rv. 40
(1971); Comment, Land-Use Control, Externalities, and the Municial 4ffairs Doctrine: A
Border Conflict, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 432 (1975).
34. Brief of Respondent City of Irvine at 39, Stocks v. City of Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d
520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981).
35. Property ownership requirements in connection with voting rights have been consist-
ently invalidated under the federal equal protection clause. See e.g., Phoenix v. Kolodziej-
ski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The
California Supreme Court has required that a compelling state interest be demonstrated in
denying judicial access to one group and granting it to another. Payne v. Superior Ct., 17
Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
36. One cannot imagine a more irrelevant distinction in taxpayer actions. California
case law has consistently focused on the illegality of the governmental conduct. The type or
quantity of tax paid or the amount of monies illegally expended has never been a subject of
judicial concern. Any distinction based on the type of tax paid will risk giving persons with
large tax payments greater access to the courts to correct government abuses than persons
with smaller tax payments.
37. 56 Cal. App. 3d 909, 128 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1976).
38. 73 Cal. App. 3d 718, 140 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1977).
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Scott,39 disapproved of such narrowing of the taxpayer remedy, hold-
ing "that taxpayers may maintain an action under section 526a to chal-
lenge an illegal expenditure of funds even though persons directly
affected by the expenditure also have standing to sue."4 Thus, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court reaffirmed that section 526a "provides 'a gen-
eral citizen remedy for controlling illegal governmental activity.' ",41
B. Who can be Named as a Defendant?
The applicable provision of section 526a provides that an action
"may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other
person, acting in [a county, town, or city's] behalf.9a2 On its face, the
statute applies only to specific agents or officers of the governmental
entity rather than to the entity itself. Notwithstanding this limitation,
nonrestrictive interpretations by the courts of statutory and common
law requirements for taxpayers' suits have permitted plaintiffs to main-
tain actions against governmental entities such as counties 3 and cit-
ies.' Likewise, decisional law indicates that it may also be proper to
join bondholders or contractors as defendants in a taxpayer's action.a
39. 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980).
40. Id at 449, 613 P.2d at 224, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 163; see Mendoza v. County of Tulare,
128 Cal. App. 3d 403, 180 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1982). In Darr v. Aivord, 101 Cal. App. 3d 480,
161 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1980), the court of appeal held that § 526a could not be invoked to
enjoin the collection or expenditure of a tax claimed to be illegally imposed. Id at 486-87,
161 Cal. Rptr. at 662. The decision was predicated upon a statutory scheme designed to
resolve such disputes in a tax refund proceeding. Id at 486, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 661. In light
of Van.A/ta, the precedential value of this decision remains to be seen. In Comblum v. San
Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 110 Cal. App. 3d 976, 168 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1980), the court
of appeal held that a taxpayer's suit challenging jail conditions was moot because a similar
lawsuit had already been filed by inmates. "To authorize a taxpayer's suit by these plaintiffs
when another suit was in progress. . . brought by persons with an immeasurably greater
stake in the issues tendered is to invite a duplicative, unnecessary lawsuit." Id at 982, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 298. Although the court purported to follow Van Ata, the precedential value
of this decision also remains to be seen.
41. 27 Cal. 3d at 447, 613 P.2d at 222, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (quoting White v. Davis, 13
Cal. 3d 757, 763, 533 P.2d 222, 226, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1975)); see Collins, Controversial
Calif Bail Decision Expands Standing in Taxpayer Suits, Western L.J., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 2,
Col. 1.
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 1979).
43. Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 880 (1972); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956); Ad-
vance Med. Diagnostic Laboratories v. County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. App. 3d 263, 129
Cal. Rptr. 723 (1976).
44. Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 880 (1972); Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 415 P.2d 769, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1966); Carl v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 3d 265, 132 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1976).
45. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 52.45, at 87; see Smith v. Mount Diablo Unified Scho6l
Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 412, 128 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1976).
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The express language of the statute also would appear to preclude
its application to state officials who do not fall within the class of enu-
merated defendants. Here again, California courts have recognized a
taxpayer's cause of action against state officials independent of section
526a's provisions.4 6 Similarly, in Duskin v. San Francisco Redevelop-
ment Agency,47 the court held that a taxpayer's suit could be main-
tained against a state agency where the complaint was not specifically
limited to a section 526a cause of action. 8 These cases illustrate the
significance of an independent common law doctrine which the courts
will sometimes utilize in addition to, or instead of, section 526a to en-
courage the successful institution of taxpayers' suits.
C. Remedies Available in Taxpayers'Actions
For public interest suits to be effective, broad relief must be avail-
able. Depending upon the illegal governmental act committed, the ap-
propriate remedy will require such relief as may be necessary to
reimburse the public, punish the wrongful parties, or prevent continua-
tion of the act in question.
A taxpayer seeking to challenge the illegal expenditure of public
funds has available a wide range of remedies to ensure governmental
compliance with the controlling law. While section 526a is directed to
injunctive actions "restraining or preventing" the illegal expenditure of
public monies, California courts have sustained taxpayers' actions
where the relief sought was mandamus, 49 declaratory,50 or damages on
46. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (1971);
Hooper v. Deukmejian, 122 Cal. App. 3d 987, 1018-19, 176 Cal. Rptr. 569, 587-88 (1981);
Central Valley Chapter of the 7th Step ]Found., Inc. v. Younger, 95 Cal. App. 3d 212, 232,
157 Cal. Rptr. 117, 128 (1979); Farley v. Corey, 78 Cal. App. 3d 583, 588-89, 144 Cal. Rptr.
923, 926 (1978); Los Altos Property Owners Ass'n v. Hutcheon, 69 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29-30,
137 Cal. Rptr. 775, 779 (1977); California State Employees' Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App.
3d 390, 395, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (1970); Ahlgren v. Carr, 209 Cal. App. 2d 248, 252-54,25
Cal. Rptr. 887, 890-91 (1962); see Note, Cal/brnia Taxpayers' Suits: Suing State Officers
Under Section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 477 (1976).
47. 31 Cal. App. 3d 769, 107 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1973); see Manin Hosp. Dist. v. Department
of Health, 92 Cal. App. 3d 442, 449-50, 154 Cal. Rptr. 838, 841-42 (1979) (hospital district);
Card v. Community Redev. Agency, 61 Cal. App. 3d 570,574, 131 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (1976)
(redevelopment agency).
48. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 773-74, 1.07 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
49. Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 449-50, 613 P.2d 210, 224, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 163
(1980); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 151, 520 P.2d 961, 964, 113
Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (1974); Knoff v. City & County of San Francisco, 1 Cal. App. 3d 184,
198, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683, 691-92 (1969).
50. Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 449-50, 613 P.2d 210, 224, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 163
(1980); Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 223, 551 P.2d 1, 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 708 (1976);
Central Valley Chapter of the 7th Step Found., Inc. v. Younger, 95 Cal. App. 3d 212, 232,
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behalf of the public entity. 1 The interposition of common law princi-
ples in such cases may well have been responsible for producing greater
relief than that expressly provided for under section 526a.
In actions to "restrain or prevent" the illegal expenditure of public
funds, one need not identify the tax dollars illegally expended. The
California Supreme Court has specifically adopted the holding of a
lower court that "the mere 'expending [of] the time of. . . [paid offi-
cials] in performing illegal and unauthorized acts' constituted an un-
lawful use of funds which could be enjoined under section 526a."' 2
Moreover, decisional law holds that "[i]t is immaterial that the amount
of the illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures actu-
ally permit a saving of tax funds."53 The rule of these cases is consis-
tent with the essential purpose of taxpayers' suits--to prevent illegal
governmental action. To focus instead on the amount of tax dollars
actually expended for such purposes would frustrate the aim of taxpay-
ers' suits.
California courts have not generally conditioned the granting of
permanent injunctive relief in taxpayers' suits upon a showing of tradi-
157 Cal. Rptr. 117, 128 (1979); Card v. Community Redev. Agency, 61 Cal. App. 3d 570,
583, 131 Cal. Rptr. 153, 163 (1976).
51. Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424,449-50, 613 P.2d 210, 224, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 163
(1980); Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 226, 551 P.2d 1, 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 711 (1976);
Briare v. Mathews, 202 Cal. 1, 8, 258 P. 939, 942 (1927); Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 482,
150 P. 367, 368 (1915). The justification for the taxpayers damages action was extensively
explored in the early case of Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 P. 367 (1915). The Osburn
court, while recognizing that § 526a does not specifically authorize such an action, noted that
the statutory language "does not in letter or in spirit forbid a taxpayer from seeking to
recover on behalf of his municipality the same moneys if illegally expended." _d at 482, 150
P. at 368. For a more extensive discussion of the taxpayers' damages action, see Collins &
Myers, supra note 21, at 342-46.
52. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 268, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (1971)
(quoting Wirin v. Horall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504-05, 193 P.2d 470, 474 (1948)). In Blair,
the court stated:
It appears from the complaint that plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendants, who admit-
tedly are county officials, from expending their own time and the time of other
county officials in executing claim and delivery process. If the claim and delivery
law is unconstitutional, then county officials may be enjoined from spending their
time carrying out its provisions even though by the collection of fees from those
invoking the provisional remedy the procedures actually effect a saving of tax
funds.
5 Cal. 3d at 269, 486 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citations omitted).
53. Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957); accord Blair v. Pitch-
ess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 269, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (1971). Some jurisdictions,
unlike California, require that the illegal or unauthorized act actually "result in an increase
of... [the plaintiffs] taxes or will otherwise result in direct or indirect pecuniary injury."
McQuILLIN, supra note 5, § 52.13, at 24.
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tional equitable requirements. 4 In Crowe v. Boyle,55 the California
Supreme Court articulated the applicable standard: "In this state we
have been very liberal in the application of the rule permitting taxpay-
ers to bring a suit to prevent the illegal conduct of city Qfficials, and no
showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer has been held
necessary."
56
The showing required for taxpayer injunctive relief is minimal,
which helps to further section 526a's priihary purpose of "[giving] a
large body of citizens standing to challenge governmental actions. '5 7
Observing that "[i]t is elementary that public officials must themselves
obey the law,"58 the California Supreme Court has declared that sec-
tion 526a "provide[s] a general citizen remedy for controlling illegal
governmental activity.
'59
It is now well established that ample relief must be available in
taxpayers' actions. A recent pronouncement by the California
Supreme Court reiterates this point: "To achieve the 'socially thera-
peutic purpose' of section 526a, 'provision must be made for a broad
basis of relief. Otherwise, the perpetration of public wrongs would
54. But cf. Cota v. County of Los Angeles, 105 Cal. App. 3d 282, 164 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1980) (trial court may exercise discretion in balancing the equities of relative hardship
where injunction may result in severe harm to the public). The issuance of injunctive relief
in California is governed by statute and judicial decisions. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3422
(West 1970); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 1979).
To date, no California court has specifically articulated the showing necessary for a
preliminary injunction to issue in a taxpayer's action. The traditional test for preliminary
injunctive relief generally, i.e., the balancing of the equities of the parties, has been set forth
in numerous cases. See Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 439 P.2d 889, 67
Cal. Rptr. 761 (1968); Socialist Workers 1974 Cal. Campaign Comm. v. Brown, 53 Cal. App.
3d 879, 125 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1975); California State Univ. v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121
Cal. Rptr. 85 (1975); Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 116 Cal.
Rpt:. 487 (1974). However, application of this test in the context of taxpayers' suits is clearly
inappropriate. The policies underlying taxpayers' actions dictate that the plaintiffs
probability of success on the merits should be the only showing necessary for issuance of a
preliminary injunction. See Collins & Myers, supra note 21, at 342-43. But see Gluck v.
County of Los Angeles, 93 Cal. App. 3d 121, 136, 155 Cal. Rptr. 435, 443 (1979) (Hanson, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that preliminary injunction not appropriate in tax-
payer action unless traditional requirements are satisfied).
55. 184 Cal. 117, 193 P. 111 (1920).
56. Id at 152, 193 P. at 125.
57. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 269,486 P.2d 1242, 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 50 (1971).
58. Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 894, 313 P.2d 844, 846 (1957). One of the classic
statements of this proposition can be found in the majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court stated: "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence." Id at 659; see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,.485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
59. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d-757, 763, 533 P.2d 222, 226, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1975).
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continue almost unhampered.' "60
III. CONSUMER STANDING
The California Legislature has adopted a wide variety of statutes
designed to provide protection for consumers.6 1 Beyond providing
remedies for individually aggrieved consumers,62 the legislature has
provided for private attorney general actions to redress unlawful con-
sumer practices. 3
California Business and Professions Code section 17200 outlaws a
variety of unlawful practices: "As used in this chapter, unfair competi-
tion shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and
any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with section 17500) of
Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code."' In Busi-
60. Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424,,450, 613 P.2d 210, 225, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 163
(1980) (quoting Collins & Myers, supra note 21, at 340).
61. E.g., Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1981); Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.1-.35 (West
1973 & Supp. 1981); Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 1788-1788.32 (West Supp. 1981); Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Protection
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1790.4 (West 1973 & Supp. 1981); Unruh Act, CAL. Civ. CODE
§§ 1801-1807 (West 1973 & Supp. 1981); Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act,
CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 2981-2984.4 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981).
62. See supra note 61.
63. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17208 (West Supp. 1981). These provisions were
added to the Business and Professions Code in 1977. Act of July 7, 1977, ch. 299, § 1, 1977
Cal. Stat. 1201-02. Although new to the Business and Professions Code, many of these pro-
visions had been contained in Civil Code § 3369, amended in 1977. Former California Civil
Code § 3369 provided:
1. Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a penalty
or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in a case of nuisance or
unfair competition.
2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair competi-
tion within this State may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.
3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include unlaw-
ful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or mislead-
ing advertising and any act denounced by Business and Professions Code Sections
17500 to 17535, inclusive.
4. As used in this section, the term person shall mean and include natural
persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and
other organizations of persons.
5. Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by the Attor-
ney General or any district attorney or any city attorney of a city having a popula-
tion in excess of 750,000, and, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city
prosecutor in any city or city and county having a fulltime city prosecutor in the
name of the people of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon
the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or by any
person acting for the interest of itself, its members or the general public.
Act of Sept. 16, 1976, ch. 1005, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 2378-79.
64. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1981).
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ness and Professions Code section 17204, enforcement powers are spe-
cifically conferred on persons acting for the general public:
Actions for injunction pursuant to this chapter may be
prosecuted by the Attorney General or any district attorney or
any city attorney of a city having a population in excess of
750,000, and, with the consent of the district attorney, by a
city prosecutor in any city or city and county having a full-
time city prosecutor in the name of the people of the State of
California upon their own complaint or upon the complaint
of any board, officer, person, corporation or associations or by
anyperson actingfor the interests of itself its members or the
generalpublic 
6 5
Consistent with the statute's remedial nature, broad equitable relief
66
and substantial civil penalties67 have been authorized.
There have been several attempts to narrow the scope of the unfair
business practices statute. For example, in Barquis v. Merchants Collec-
tion Association,68 the defendant sought to limit the scope of the statute
to competitive injury and, alternatively, to conduct that was fraudulent
or deceptive. 69 The California Supreme Court rejected the invitation to
taper the scope of the statutory scheme. In holding that the statute was
not limited to competitive injury, the court stated:
We conclude that in a society which enlists a variety of
psychological and advertising stimulants to induce the con-
sumption of goods, consumers, rather than competitors, need
the greatest protection from sharp business practices. Given
65. Id at § 17204 (emphasis added).
66. California Business and Professions Code § 17203 provides:
Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair competition
within this state may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court
may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as
may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice
which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be nec-
essary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal,
which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West Supp. 1981).
67. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17206-17207 (West Supp. 1981). California Business
and Professions Code § 17206 provides for civil penalties of up to $2,500.00 per violation.
California Business and Professions Code § 17207 provides for civil penalties of up to
$6,000.00 per violation for violating any injunction issued pursuant to Business and Profes-
sions Code § 17203. See su.pra note 66. Standing to seek recovery of civil penalties has been
vested only with public officials or agencies.
68. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
69. In Barquis, the plaintiffs challenged the practice of a licensed collection agency in
filing debt collection actions in improper counties for the purpose of making it more difficult
for consumers to defend the actions. Id at 97, 496 P.2d at 819, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
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the terms of the section, the purpose of the enactment and the
controlling precedent, we reject defendant's suggested limita-
tion of section 3369 [now Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 17204] to "anti-competitive" business practices.70
The court specifically noted that the "broad standing provision
71
demonstrated "a clear design to protect consumers as well as
competitors. 72
The Barquis court also emphasized that the statutory scheme was
not limited to deceptive practices. The court looked at the statute and
concluded that its "sweeping language [was intended] to permit tribu-
nals to enjoin ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context
such activity might occur."'73
As the court in Barquis declared, Business and Professions Code
section 17204 contains a "broad standing provision." California courts
70. Id at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (citations omitted).
71. Id at 110 n.11, 496 P.2d at 828-29 n.11, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57 n.11.
72. Id at 110, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
73. Id at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (footnote omitted). In Barquis, the
court found that since the challenged practices were unlawful, there was no necessity to
determine the unfairness of the defendant's conduct. Id at 112, 496 P.2d at 830, 101 Cal.
Rptr. at 758. The court did note that the statute authorized equitable relief against business
practices found to be unfair.
In permitting the restraining of all "unfair" business practices, section 3369
undeniably establishes only a wide standard to guide courts of equity; as noted
above, given the creative nature of the scheming mind, the Legislature evidently
concluded that a less inclusive standard would not be adequate.
Id; see People v. James, 122 Cal. App. 3d 25, 36, 177 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1981) ("[tjhe fact
that defendants' scheme had never been dealt with by the appellate court does not render it
any less fundamentally dishonest, unfair, or unlawful"); People ex rel. Mosk v. National
Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1962) ("fraudulent business
practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery").
In Motors, Inc. v. Times-Mirror Co., 102 Cal. App. 3d 735, 162 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1980),
the court elaborated on the definition of unfairness:
To these .open-ended definitions of unfairness, we would add this obvious
thought: that the determination of whether a particular business practice is unfair
necessarily involves an examination of its impact on its alleged victim, balanced
against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. In brief,
the court must weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of
the harm to the alleged victim-a weighing process quite similar to the one en-
joined on us by the law of nuisance. While this process is complicated enough
after a hearing in which the defendant has revealed the factors determining the
utility of his conduct, it is really quite impossible if only the plaintiff has been
heard from, as is the case when it is sought to decide the issue of unfairness on
demurrer. Therefore--since the complaint is unlikely to reveal defendant's justifi-
cation-if that pleading states a prima facie case of harm, having its genesis in an
apparently unfair business practice, the defendant should be made to present its
side of the story. If, as will often be the case, the utility of the conduct clearly
justifies the practice, no more than a simple motion for summary judgment would
be called for.
Id at 740, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (citations and footnote omitted).
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have consistently applied the section to give full effect to the statutory
language.74 "The code authorizes any person to bring an action on be-
half of the general public to enjoin 'unlawful, unfair or fraudulent busi-
ness practice.' "I' Relief is appropriate notwithstanding the availability
of other enforcement mechanisms7 6 and notwithstanding the plaintiff's
lack of any personal interest in the controversy.77
The "broad standing" permitted by section 17204 is illustrated by
the recent decision of the California Court of Appeal in Hernandez v.
Atlantic Finance Co. 78 In Hernandez, the plaintiff brought suit on be-
half of the general public seeking to enjoin an automobile dealer and
loan company from violating the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Fi-
nance Act.79 The plaintiff had not entered into any business transac-
tion with the defendants, either by purchasing an automobile or
borrowing money.Y0
The defendants argued "that this section does not enlarge the
number of persons who may seek injunction to prevent unlawful busi-
ness practices, and that traditional concepts of standing must be read
into the statute."'" The court rejected this argument, noting that
neither the legislative history nor judicial decisions reflected any inten-
tion "to narrowly circumscribe the class of persons who may seek in-
junction under its terms."82 The court concluded: "we read the statute
as expressly authorizing the institution of action by any person on be-
74. See People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980);
Bondanza v. Peninsula Hosp. & Med. Center, 23 Cal. 3d 260, 590 P.2d 22, 152 Cal. Rptr. 446
(1979); Chem v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976);
Hernandez v. Atlantic Fin. Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 65, 164 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1980).
75. Bondanza v. Peninsula Hosp. & Med. Center, 23 Cal. 3d 260, 265, 590 P.2d 22, 25,
152 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449 (1979) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp.
1981)).
76. See People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 632-33, 602 P.2d 731, 734, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811,
814 (1980); People v. Los Angeles Palm, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 3d 25, 32-33, 175 Cal. Rptr. 257,
262 (1981); People v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 120 Cal. App. 3d 459, 473-76, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 728, 735-37 (1981); Coast & S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Trans Coast Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 16 Cal. App. 3d 205, 209-10, 93 Cal. Rptr. 791, 794 (1971). These holdings are clearly
consistent with, if not now required by, Business and Professions Code § 17205: "Unless
otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumula-
tive to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this
state." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17205 (West Supp. 1981).
77. Hernandez v. Atlantic Fin. Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 65, 164 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1980).
78. 105 Cal. App. 3d 65, 164 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1980).
79. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-2984.4 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981).
80. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 283. The record indicates that plaintiff's
mother had purchased an automobile and borrowed money from the defendants. Id at 73,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
81. Id at 71-72, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
82. Id at 73, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
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half of the general public. The Legislature has provided that suit may
be brought by any person acting in his own behalf or on behalf of the
general public." 3
Under section 17204, it is clear that any person may seek to enjoin
unlawful business practices in California. The only requirement neces-
sary to invoke its provisions is that the person 84 plead that the action is
brought on behalf of the general public pursuant to section 17204.5 As
such, the statutory scheme provides generous protection to consumers
by focusing the judicial inquiry on the conduct of the defendant and
not on the standing of the plaintiff.86
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING
Cognizant of the need to ensure that issues of public importance
are resolved, California courts have consistently abandoned rigid
standing requirements even in the absence of some special standing
statute. "In recent years there has been a marked accommodation of
formerly strict procedural requirements of standing to. .. sue and of
even capacity to sue. . . where matters relating to the 'social and eco-
nomic realities of the present-day organization of society'. . . are con-
cerned."8 7 In McDonald v. Stockton Metropolitan Transit District,"8 the
court announced:
When the duty is sharp and the public need weighty, the
83. Id at 72, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
84. For purposes of the statute, "the term person shall mean and include natural per-
sons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other organi-
zations of persons." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17201 (West Supp. 1981).
85. In the absence of any personal standing, such an allegation is apparently necessary
to obtain injunctive relief. In Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1980), the court stated:
regardless of the broad scope of the injunctive relief afforded under the unfair busi-
ness practices act, we conclude that appellant has failed to allege a cause of action
for such relief. Appellant is not now in possession of any of the properties owned
or managed by the defendants; therefore, she has no need of or standing to seek an
injunction on her own behalf. Furthermore, appellant has failed to allege that she
is suing on behalf of the general public.
Id at 928, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 207; see Plotkin v. Tanner's Vacuums, 53 Cal. App. 3d 454,460,
125 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1975).
86. As the California Supreme Court declared in Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800,
808,484 P.2d 964,968,94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800(1971): "Protection of unwary consumers from
being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary
society." Id
87. Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 122, 109
Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1973) (citations omitted) (quoting Daniels v. Sanitarium Ass'n, 59 Cal.
2d 602, 607, 381 P.2d 652, 656, 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 832 (1963)).
88.36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1973).
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courts will grant a mandamus at the behest of an applicant
who shows no greater personal interest than that of a citizen
who wants the law enforced. . . . When the public need is
less pointed, the courts hold the petitioner to a sharper show-
ing of personal need. 89
These relaxed standing rules have found application in a number
of cases. In Bozung v. LocalAgency Formation Commission,9" the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld the right of nonresident plaintiffs to en-
force the California Environmental Quality Act:9'
We do not perceive the significance attributed by defend-
ants to whether plaintiffs live within or without the Camarillo
city boundaries. Effects of environmental abuse are not con-
tained by political lines; strict rules of standing that might be
appropriate in other contexts have no application where
broad and long-term effects are involved.92
The court of appeal in Environmental Law Fund, Inc. v. Town of
Corte Madera,93 considered, on the merits, an environmental group's
challenge to certain land use decisions of the Town of Corte Madera.
Despite the fact that the environmental group did not own property
89. Id at 440, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (citations omitted). This low threshold standing
requirement was first enunciated by the California Supreme.Court in Board of Social Wel-
fare v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 98, 162 P.2d 627 (1945):
By the preponderance of authority ... where the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it
is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the
duty in question enforced.
Id at 100-01, 162 P.2d at 628-29 (quoting 35 AM. JuR. Mandamus § 320 (1941)), This stan-
dard has won favorable application in the public interest context. See, e.g., Diaz v. Quitori-
ano, 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 811, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1969); Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co.,
222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 643, 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (1963).
The relaxed standing requirements have been applied in a wide variety of areas. See,
e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d
150, 155-58, 141 Cal. Rptr. 474, 477-78 (1977) (plaintiff had standing to challenge regulation
because of its own status as an employer which might be affected in future cases, because of
the public issue involved, and because many of its members were employers); Pillsbury v.
South Coast Regional Comm'n, 71 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 139 Cal. Rptr. 760, 765 (1977)
(non-neighbors, non-property owners, held to be aggrieved parties for purpose of challeng-
ing issuance of coastal development permit); Klitgaard & Jones, Inc. v. San Diego Coast
Regional Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 99, 110, 121 Cal. Rptr. 650, 656 (1975) (representative of
San Diego Coastwatchers Association found to be aggrieved person despite lack of direct
interest).
90. 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).
91. CAL. Pun. Rs. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977).
92. 13 Cal. 3d at 272, 529 P.2d at 1023, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
93. 49 Cal. App. 3d 105, 122 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1975).
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affected by the town's actions, and despite the fact that the group was
not even present at the administrative hearing, the court concluded that
the trial court had properly heard the merits of the group's claims:
"Respondents are thus pursuing more than privately-held rights, and
are asserting more than privately-held grievances: they are acting as
members of the public and in the public interest."94 The court con-
cluded that to bar from court a group seeking to vindicate public rights
would punish the public by insulating allegedly illegal land use prac-
tices from judicial review.95
As these cases demonstrate, California courts, even in the absence
of liberal statutory standing provisions, have regularly discarded strict
standing requirements to permit lawsuits in the public interest. None-
theless, no California appellate court has articulated generally applica-
ble standards for determining the appropriate use of these relaxed
standing requirements. Consequently, standing issues are regularly
raised in public interest litigation as a device to frustrate or avoid sub-
stantive decisionmaking. Although the public interest litigant can cite
ample precedent to overcome the standing objection, the considerable
attention devoted to standing evidences the disturbing barriers that
continue to plague current public interest litigation.96
V. ELIMINATING STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
The discussion thus far leaves little doubt concerning the low
threshold set by California courts for meeting standing requirements.
As for the jurisprudence of public interest standing, there are two kinds
of problems---"those that have been answered and those that have not
been answered." 97 In the latter category, the courts have engaged in no
genuine and searching examination of the standing requirements they
are supposedly relaxing. Although many decisions suggest that federal
94. Id at 114, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
95. The court stated:
Application of the exhaustion doctrine against them, by reason of teir "default" in
the administrative proceeding to which they were not "parties" at all, would mean
in effect the imputation of their "default" to the public in the absence of any fac-
tual basis for such imputation. In general, the doctrine would thus operate to bar
the public from redressing a public wrong; specifically, it would burden the public
of the Town, in perpetuity, with the illegal zoning of a substantial area of the com-
munity by insulating the zoning action from judicial review.
This result would not be consistent with principles of waiver or resfudicata,
and it would totally disserve the public interest.
Id
96. See Stocks v. City of Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981).
97. Rodell, .4 Primer on Interstate Taxation, 44 YALE L.J. 1166, 1167 (1935).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW.REVIEW [Vol. 15
standing requirements are inapplicable,9" there is no comprehensive in-
dependent discussion of the basis for California standing requirements.
To determine the proper role of standing in public interest litigation, it
is important to explore the doctrinal basis for California's standing
requirement.
Federal standing requirements are based, in part, on the "case or
controversy" requirement of article III of the federal constitution.99
While article III limits the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, it of
course has no application to state courts. Unlike the United States
Constitution, the California Constitution contains no "case or contro-
versy" provision. This alone renders inapplicable much of the discus-
sion contained in federal cases.
The California Constitution is not silent on the appropriate role of
the judiciary: "The judicial power of this State is vested in the
Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts,
and justice courts.""l°° Moreover, article III, section 3 of the California
Constitution provides: "The powers of state government are legisla-
tive, executive and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one
power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
Constitution."' 101
The separation of powers doctrine of article III, section 3, has con-
sistently been held to act as a bar to advisory opinions. As the Califor-
98. See, e.g., White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,763, 533 P.2d 222,226, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98
(1975) ("restrictive federal doctrine of justiciability ... does not apply to taxpayer suits in
California"); McDonald v. Stockton Metropolitan Transit Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 440
n.4, Ill Cal. Rptr. 637, 641 n.4 (1973) ("we apply the California criterion of beneficial inter-
est [in mandate cases] without concern over petitioner's standing to maintain an equity ac-
tion in a federal court").
99. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163-
64 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
429, 433-35 (1952); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Jaffe, StandingAgain, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 633 (1971).
100. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 1. The other provisions of article VI contain some limitations
on the judicial power unrelated to any concept of standing. For example, the power of the
appellate courts to set aside a trial court judgment in certain situations is restricted. CAL.
CONsT. art. VI, § 13.
101. CAL. CONsT. art. III, § 3. The primary purpose of this section, which embodies the
separation of powers doctrine, "is to prevent the combination in the hands of a single person
or group of the basic or fundamental powers of government." Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83,
89, 113 P.2d 873, 877 (1941). This provision prohibits legislative interference with the con-
stitutional jurisdiction of California courts. Merco Constr. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Municipal Ct., 21
Cal. 3d 724, 581 P.2d 636, 147 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1978); Vidal v. Backs, 218 Cal. 99,21 P.2d 952
(1933); Dorris v. McKamy, 168 Cal. 531, 143 P. 752 (1914); Frazier v. Moffatt, 108 Cal. App.
2d 379, 239 P.2d 123 (1952).
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nia Supreme Court has often stated, "[tihe rendering of advisory
opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this
court." 2 Except for this prohibition against advisory opinions, there
does not appear to be any other constitutional limitation on the exercise
of'judicial power.
The absence of a clear constitutional basis for standing makes the
search for the underpinnings of this requirement difficult. Although
standing requirements are frequently invoked, judicial decisions do not
reveal any clear discussion of their origin. For example, in Calfornia
Water & Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles,103 the court of appeal
stated: "The principle that courts will not entertain an action which is
not founded on an actual controversy is a tenet of common law juris-
prudence, the precise content of which is difficult to define and hard to
apply.' ' 104
In Blair v. Pitchess,"'0 the California Supreme Court recognized
the existence of a case or controversy requirement. However, the court
concluded that "if an action meets the requirements of section 526a, it
presents a true case or controversy":
10 6
If we were to hold that such suits did not present a true case
or controversy unless the plaintiff and the defendant each had
a special, personal interest in the outcome, we would drasti-
cally curtail their usefulness as a check on illegal governmen-
tal activity. Few indeed are the government officers who have
a personal interest in the continued validity of their official
acts. 1
0 7
102. Lynch v. Superior Ct., I Cal. 3d 910, 912, 464 P.2d 126, 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670, 671
(1970); see Younger v. Superior Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 102, 119-20, 577 P.2d 1014, 1025, 145 CaL
Rptr. 674, 685 (1978); Chem v. Bank of Am., 15 Cal. 3d 866* 875, 544 P.2d 1310, 1315, 127
Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1976); People v. Fox, 73 Cal. App. 3d 178, 182, 140 Cal. Rptr. 615, 618
(1977). Advisory opinions are likewise prohibited by the United States Constitution, imple-
menting both the separation of powers doctrine and the article III case or controversy re-
quirement. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). However, the constitutions of several
states permit advisory opinions. Field, The 4dvisory Opinion-4n.4naysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203
(1949).
103. 253 Cal. App. 2d 16, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1967).
104. Id at 22-23, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 623; see Zetterberg v. California State Dep't of Pub.
Health, 43 Cal. App. 3d 657, 118 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1974).
105. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
106. Id at 269, 486 P.2d at 1249-50, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
107. Id (citations and footnote omitted). In Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d
210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980), the California Supreme Court made clear that a taxpayer suit
for declaratory judgment satisfied the "actual controversy" requirement necessary for such
relief-
Since section 526a authorizes taxpayer suits for declaratory relief, the further
contention that this suit lacks justiciability because plaintiffs have not satisfied the
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW JEVIEW
As can be seen, California courts have employed case or contro-
versy language without careful analysis and notwithstanding the ab-
sence of an article III-type provision in the state constitution. Although
its incorporation into state standing law is difficult to trace, the case or
controversy requirement appears to have first originated as a judicially
created guide to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions. However, as
a number of early cases suggest,108 the so-called case or controversy
requirement was not a rigid rule.
In Robinson v. Kerrigan,109 the California Supreme Court consid-
ered the validity of a statute providing for in rem proceedings to estab-
lish title to real property." 0 A superior court judge refused to
recognize the statute on the ground that the proceeding was not prop-
erly a judicial one. Although recognizing that the exercise of judicial
power necessarily "implied the existence of an actual present contro-
versy,"'' the supreme court nevertheless expansively interpreted the
scope of the judicial power.
Initially, the court recognized that complexities in society "have
long required the extension of the judicial power beyond the settlement
of controversies which have actually arisen, so as to include the func-
tion of providing security against disputes and claims which may
arise."'"2 Accordingly, the court noted that the proper role of the judi-
ciary includes the power to prevent controversies by acting on "un-
known, hostile claims and pretensions, or to merely declare a status or
right." 113- The court specifically concluded that such adjudication was
within the constitutional powers of the judiciary:
Whether or not this is strictly an exercise of judicial power, as
originally instituted, it cannot be denied that it is a power of
the class which, from time immemorial, has been committed
to and exercised by the courts. At the time the Constitution
was adopted this class of powers had long been usually exer-
cised by the courts alone. It must be presumed that in provid-
"actual controversy" requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 must
also fail. An action, such as this one, which meets the criteria of section 526a satis-
fies case or controversy requirements.
Id at 450 n.28, 613 P.2d at 225 n.28, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 163 n.28.
108. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
109. 151 Cal. 40, 90 P. 129 (1907).
110. Id at 42; 90 P. at 130. The law was entitled "[a]n act for the certification of land
titles and the simplification of the transfer of real estate." Act of Mar. 17, 1897, ch. 110, 1897
Cal. Stat. 138.
111. 151 Cal. at 47, 90 P. at 131.
112. Id at 47, 90 P. at 132.
113. Id
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ing therein for the division of governmental power into three
departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, and declaring
that no person charged with the exercise of the powers be-
longing to one of them should exercise functions appertaining
to either of the others, this usual power of the courts was in
mind, and that it was intended that the courts should continue
to exercise these quasi judicial powers, as they had previously
been accustomed to do.'
14
In Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan,I" the California
Supreme Court was required to determine the validity of a statutory
scheme for quieting title to real property." 6 The statute was chal-
lenged on the basis that it conferred nonjudicial power on the courts
and thus violated the separation of powers doctrine. 1 7 The court ac-
knowledged the general proposition that "the judicial function is the
determination of controversies between parties."".. However, the court
noted that the proceeding may nevertheless be judicial notwithstanding
the absence of an adversary party:
But it is not to be understood that it is never the exercise of a
114. I1d at 48, 90 P. at 132. The court noted that the potential for adverse claims was an
additional basis for concluding that the power was judicial:
Furthermore, in such matters, there is always a possibility that there may be a
hostile claim or dispute as to the right to be established. If it were necessary to find
further justification for classing this power as judicial, this circumstance would be
sufficient. A hostile claim being possible, there is, in contemplation of law, an
adverse claim to be settled, a right to be protected against the possible claimant, for
which a judicial decree is the only practicable and effectual remedy.
Id
Another definition of judicial power was articulated in Marin Water & Power Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 171 Cal. 706, 154 P. 864 (1916):
The judicial function is to "declare the law and define the rights of the parties
under it." [Frasher v. Rader, 124 Cal. 132, 134, 56 P. 797, 797 (1899)]. To deter-
mine "what shall be adjudged or decreed between the parties, and with which is
the right of the case, is judicial action." [Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838)]. "A determination of the rights of an individual under
existing laws" is an exercise of judicial power. [Quinchard v. Board of Trustees,
113 Cal. 664, 669, 45 P. 856, 857 (1896)]. An essential element of judicial power,
distinguishing it from legislative power, is that it requires "the ascertainment of
existing rights." [People ex rel Dean v. Board of Supervisors, 122 Cal. 421,424, 55
P. 131, 132 (1898)]. "It is not to be disputed that, as a general proposition, the
judicial function is the determination of controversies between parties." [Title
Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 319, 88 P. 356, 364 (1906)].
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose
and end." [Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)].
Id at 711-12, 154 P. at 866-67.
115. 150 Cal. 289, 88 P. 356 (1906).
116. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 59, 1906 Cal. Stats. Extra. Sess. 78.
117. 150 Cal. at 318-19, 88 P. at 363-64.
118. Id at 319, 88 P. at 364.
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judicial function for a court to act upon the application of a
party who seeks some form of relief, even though at the outset
of the proceeding no person is named or designated as oppos-
ing the granting of such relief. "It is certainly clear as a gen-
eral rule . . . that whenever the law confers a right, and
authorizes an application to a court of justice to enforce that
right, the proceedings upon such an application are to be re-
garded as of a judicial nature."' 19
The court noted a number of instances where judicial power has
been upheld in the absence of any actual dispute. For example, the
court pointed out that "[a] petition for change of name . . . discloses
neither controversy nor an actual or threatened denial by any one of
petitioner's right, yet such proceeding is judicial."1 0 The potential for
dispute was sufficient to give rise to an exercise of the judicial power
without running afoul of the advisory opinion admonition.
As these early cases indicate, the courts did not narrowly circum-
scribe their power so as to preclude decisionmaking in the absence of
an actual controversy between two identifiable parties. Thus, it is not
surprising that statutory schemes providing for various types of judicial
determinations have been consistently upheld when challenged on the
basis of the absence of an actual controversy.
1 2 1
It is apparent that the "case or controversy" requirement is not a
sacrosanct constitutional principle that California courts must blindly
follow.'2 2 Instead, the requirement originated as a guide for avoiding
119. Id (citation omitted).
120. Id at 320, 88 P. at 364 (citation omitted).
121. See In re La Socint6 Frangaise d'Epargus Et De Pr6voyance Mutuelle, 123 Cal. 525,
56 P. 458 (1899) (petition for change of name); Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 P. 495
(1923) (declaratory judgments); Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal.
289, 88 P. 356 (1906) (quiet title); Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 P. 129 (1907) (Tor-
rens Law); Cullen v. Glendora Water Co., 113 Cal. 503, 39 P. 769 (1896) (validation statute).
122. Many of the cases that articulate the case or controversy requirement suggest that
the rule is based in part upon the inclination to avoid interference with some other branch of
government. Thus, California courts have repeatedly stated:
It is well-settled law that the courts will not give their consideration to questions as
to the constitutionality of a statute unless such consideration is necessary to the
determination of a real and vital controversy between the litigants in the particular
case before it. It is incumbent upon a party to an action or proceeding who assails
a law invoked in the course thereof to show that the provisions of the statute thus
assailed are applicable to him and that he is injuriously affected thereby.
People v. Perry, 212 Cal. 186, 193, 298 P. 19, 22 (1931); see Miller v. Municipal Ct., 22 Cal.
2d 818, 142 P.2d 297 (1943); City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal. 2d 685, 140
P.2d 666 (1943); People v. Globe Grain & Milling Co., 211 Cal. 121, 294 P. 3 (1930); A.F.
Eastabrook Co. v. Industrial Accident Conm'n, 177 Cal. 767, 177 P. 848 (1918); Franklin v.
Peterson, 87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (1948); County of Ventura v. Southern Cal.
Vol. 15
1981] STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 25
the rendering of advisory opinions. As the California Supreme Court
stated in City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd,12 courts will not
entertain "an action not founded upon an actual controversy between
the parties to it, but which is brought for the purpose of securing a
determination of a point of law for the gratification of the curiosity of
the litigants."' 24
Recently, in Stocks v. City of Irvine,125 the court of appeal pointed
out that the purpose of standing requirements is to avoid the rendering
of advisory opinions:
In cases challenging governmental actions, the standing
requirement is the rudder that allows courts to navigate be-
tween two equally objectionable hazards. On the one side is
the risk that the judiciary will impinge upon powers of the
other branches of government by issuing advisory
opinions. ...
But, the farther a court goes to avoid the advisory opin-
ion hazard, the closer it comes to the opposite hazard: the
shutting off of all reasonable avenues of judicial redress to a
truly aggrieved plaintiff.'26
It is manifest that California standing requirements are designed
to ensure that courts do not exceed their constitutional authority.
Edison Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d 529, 193 P.2d 512 (1948); In re De Voe, 114 Cal. App. 730, 300
P. 874 (1931).
Even this rule had its exceptions. As the court stated in Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021 (1920):
The reason for the exception is in the nature of a rule developed for the regulation
of the ultimate and supreme function of the courts to declare unconstitutional stat-
utes to be void and of no effect; and such a regulatory rule must itself be subject to
exception where it would otherwise operate to prevent altogether the exercise of
this function, a function which it is the most solemn duty of the courts to exercise
in a state governed under a written constitution which is the supreme law of the
land. Where no member of a class discriminated against could ever attack the
constitutionality of the discriminatory statute, the rule reserving to such persons
the right to raise the constitutional question would totally prevent the exercise by
the court of'its function of passing upon that question and would place it in a
position where it would for all time enforce rights and obligations created by an
obviously void enactment. In such case any litigant to the determination of whose
claim the constitutional question is fairly relevant should be permitted to raise the
constitutional question.
Id at 32, 192 P. at 1024; see Pacific Indem. Co. v. Myers, 211 Cal. 635, 644, 296 P. 1084,
1087 (1931).
123. 22 Cal. 2d 685, 140 P.2d 666 (1943).
124. Id at 693-94, 140 P.2d at 670; see Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214
Cal. 308, 316, 5 P.2d 585, 589-90 (1931).
125. 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981). The Stocks court upheld the right
of nonresident plaintiffs to challenge the exclusionary zoning practices of the City of Irvine.
126. Id at 530, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
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Viewed as a means of judicial self-governance, standing requirements
can certainly be discarded so long as judicial authority is not exceeded.
Given the changes that have occurred in social institutions since stand-
ing requirements were first formulated, 127 courts should reevaluate the
utility of such requirements in light of the purpose standing serves.
Conditioning judicial access on standing expressed in case or con-
troversy language may have been an appropriate vehicle in the past to
avoid advisory opinions. However, standing requirements are ill-suited
to guiding courts in modem day litigation:
Faced by the proven inadequacy of the traditional solu-
tions, contemporary legal systems have been turning to more
complex, sophisticated, and flexible solutions which have
proven much more effective in dealing with the problem of
protecting the emerging diffuse rights. Essentially, these mod-
em solutions consist of. . . utilizing the initiative and zeal of
private persons and organizations by allowing them to act in
court for a general or group interest, even though they may
not be directly injured in their own individual rights. 128
Thus, the time has come for judicial rejection of standing requirements
in public interest litigation.
In litigation between private citizens and the government, judicial
inquiry should not focus on the standing of the plaintiff. Standing re-
quirements in public interest litigation often obscure the fact that
standing is not an end in itself but only a vehicle to avoid advisory
opinions. Judicial emphasis should therefore be on the availability of
meaningful relief within constitutional and statutory limits and not on
the status of the public interest litigant.
A relief-directed inquiry will ensure that public interest litigants
are not deprived of the right to challenge illegal government action
merely because a court determines that they are not sufficiently ag-
127. Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest through the Courts A Comparati vst's
Contribution, 25 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 643,o645-48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Vindicating the
Public Interest]; Kent, Property, Power & Authority, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 541, 542-45
(1975).
128. Vindicating the Public Interest, supra note 127, at 660. The abolition of standing
requirements in public interest litigation has received widespread support. See Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REy. 1281, 1304-12 (1976);
Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343,
407-08 (1974); Miller, Public Interest Group Participation in Deeisionmaking: The Broader
Meaning of the Law Reform Commission Proposals, 10 FED. L. REv. 143, 150-54 (1979);
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663
(1977); Tushnet, The Sociology ofArticle II" A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1698, 1721-25 (1980).
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grieved or injured by the government action. The notions of "ag-
grieved party" and "injury in fact" have no place in modem public
interest litigation at the state level. Although these concepts might be
simple to apply in determining private rights among parties, they have
no easy application in cases challenging public actions that have broad
societal effects. As one commentator stated:
It would be utterly unreasonable to afford the most sophisti-
cated kind of legal protection-judicial protection--only to
the more traditional needs and interests, such as private prop-
erty rights, and to deny it to the new societal needs that are
quickly becoming vital to the very survival of human
civilization.
129
Discarding standing requirements will ensure that the focus of ju-
dicial attention is on the propriety of government conduct. For exam-
ple, in Warth v. Seldin,13 ° the United States Supreme Court never
reached the legality of the zoning practices under challenge. Instead,
by focusing on the standing of the litigants, the Court avoided discus-
sion of possible illegal conduct by the municipality. Had attention
been directed to the availability of remedies to end the illegal zoning
practices, the Court would have likely concluded that real relief was
available. An injunction at the behest of the litigants would have en-
sured that zoning laws excluding poor people, if not necessarily the
plaintiffs, would be eliminated.
1 31
That standing is automatically conferred does not necessarily
mean that relief is assured. Although the litigant may succeed in bring-
ing a lawsuit, the court might well conclude on the merits that the gov-
ernment has not proceeded unlawfully. In such situations, the political
process, not the courts, is the appropriate forum to seek change. How-
ever, where the government has proceeded unlawfully, relief should
not be denied merely because the "harm is a 'generalized grievance'
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citi-
129. Cappelletti, Governmental and Pivate Advocatesfor the Public Interest in Civil Litiga-
tion A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REv. 793, 880-81 (1975).
130. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
131. Assuming some developer were willing to build in the municipality, the zoning ordi-
nance would be applied to that developer. As the court of appeal noted in Stocks v. City of
Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981), "[t]he more restrictive a city's zoning
becomes, the less likely it will be that a builder will propose a housing project that would
satisfy the needs of the excluded group." Id at 533, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 731. An injunction
against application of any illegal provisions of the zoning ordinance increases the types of
projects that private developers may propose. An injunction in this context can hardly be
characterized as an advisory opinion.
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zens."' 32 In such situations, "[it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."' 33
VI. CONCLUSION.
Litigation in the public interest necessarily implies that the liti-
gants are pursuing rights common to many persons. Therefore, the fo-
cus in public interest litigation should be on providing relief to protect
those commonly shared rights. Any other approach will dose one of
three co-equal branches of government to the public participation so
central to our constitutional system of government. As Justice Douglas
once proclaimed: "the American dream teaches that if one reaches
high enough and persists there is a forum where justice is dispensed. I
would lower the technical barriers and let the courts serve that ancient
need.""
California courts have traditionally eliminated procedural barriers
to public interest litigation. Given the reason for standing require-
ments, the time has now come for California courts to reformulate out-
moded rules so that they are consistent with their purpose. In other
words, standing requirements should be discarded and judicial focus
should be on the constitutional propriety of the relief sought.
132. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
133. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
134. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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